Abstract
Introduction

18
In many social systems a social dilemma exists where what is good for the individual is not necessarily 19 good for the group, and so explaining why in both laboratory [1, 2] and field [3, 4] experiments participants 20 are found to cooperate (act in the interests of the group) more frequently than would be expected for purely 21 rational self-interested players has proved a challenge to evolutionary biology and sociology. The prevalence 22 of cooperation between unrelated members of a population in both biological and human social systems has 23 been the subject of a long history of study, with a number of key insights over the past few decades [5] .
in a number of previous models is about how frequently the nodes on each layer update themselves. It has been found [13, 41] that the proportion of nodes that update their strategies on a network before the 66 payoff of each player is recalculated can alter the amount of cooperation in the system. What has not 67 been considered in the case of multilayered networks is whether updating each of the nodes across all layers 68 compared to just a single layer at a time affects the final amount of cooperation in the system. Whether a 69 player updates their strategy on all layers of the system at the same time or separately will depend strongly 70 on the system that is to be modelled. It is therefore important to know whether this has any effect on the 71 final frequency of cooperation in the system. This is the question that we will address in this article. 
Mathematical Model
73
In order to study the spread of cooperation on the multiplex network the public goods game (PGG) is 74 played by each of the nodes. In this game there are two possible strategies, either cooperation or defection.
75
In the PGG the players are divided into groups before donating a certain amount to the groups that they 76 are members of. The total that has been donated is then multiplied up by an enhancement factor, before 77 being divided between all of the members of that group. When playing the PGG on a network the groups 78 are defined to be those players that are connected to a common node. So, on each layer the player plays 79 the game in k + 1 groups, where k is the degree of the player on that particular layer. In the PGG, player i 80 donates an amount c i , and so the payoffs are given by
where P i C,D is the payoff of player i playing as a cooperator or a defector respectively, G is the number of 82 players in the group, N C is the number of cooperators in the group, r is the enhancement factor (the return 83 on the investment to the group) and the last term in equation (2) 
where β is a parameter that defines how responsive the player is to their neighbour's payoff. Here β = 0
104
leads to deterministic dynamics where a player will always imitate the strategy of a player with a larger 105 payoff, and β → ∞ leads to players imitating their neighbours strategy at random, with no consideration of 106 their respective payoffs.
107
In this article we investigate the effect of updating the players strategies either asynchronously or syn- cooperation is higher in the synchronous update case. Similarly, the value of η at which the system changes 137 from a mixture of strategies to complete cooperation is also higher in the case of the synchronous update.
138
This demonstrates that asynchronous updating can act as a mechanism to maintain cooperation at lower 139 enhancement factors that has not previously been considered.
140
To explain why there is a difference in the frequency of cooperation between the two update rules a 141 cartoon of three players on the multiplex, s, t and u, is shown in figures 3a and 3b. The strategies for player 142 s are s i on the top layer and s j on the bottom, and similarly for players t and u.
143
On the top layer, player s has selected player u to imitate, and on the lower layer player s will imitate 144 player t. Assuming initially that P u > P s and P t > P s , and that β is not large, figure 3a demonstrates the 145 likely strategies after a single time step, with player s imitating player u on the top layer and player t on 146 the lower layer. When updating using the asynchronous rule the neighbours (and the payoffs) of the focal 147 cooperator and defector may change before the cooperator has a chance to imitate the defector, resulting 148 in a difference in imitation probability. If this probability changes by a large amount then player s will no 149 longer imitate player t on the lower layer. Therefore updating the multiplex asynchronously rather than 150 synchronously may lead to different frequencies of cooperation. A similar mechanism was found in reference
151
[42], which found increased cooperation through strategy correlation across different network layers. We numerically calculate the expected change in probability by artificially forming neighbourhoods where bilities over all possible arrangements of N C and N D an expected imitation probability is calculated. Figure   157 4 plots this expected probability against N D for N C = 9, 10, 11 for the FCI PGG (r = 0.78, β = 0.5, k = 3).
158
This plot shows that if the group composition changes by a large amount, then the probability of a coop-159 erator imitating a neighbouring defector will be significantly affected. Therefore, there is likely to be a 160 large difference in the probability of a cooperator imitating a neighbouring defector under synchronous and 161 asynchronous updating.
162
player i selects player j to compare payoffs at time step t enables the payoffs of the two players to be 164 measured at both t and t − 1 (for t > 1). Writing these payoffs as P i (t), P j (t), P i (t − 1) and P j (t − 1) 165 and substituting them into equation (3) for both t and t − 1, the change in the probability of imitating 
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To explain why cooperation is higher for the asynchronous update rule the probability of player i im-176 itating the strategy of neighbour j for each payoff difference P j − P i is empirically measured for both the 177 asynchronous and synchronous update rules. We collected results from a single simulation for 1000 updates 178 of the entire network, and calculated the probabilities by placing each measured payoff difference into a bin 179 of width 0.1. Figure 6 shows the probability that a player imitates a neighbour's strategy plotted against 180 the payoff difference, with the plot on the left showing the probability of a cooperator imitating a defector 181 and the plot on the right showing the probability that a defector imitates a cooperator.
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What is observed for both update rules (figure 6) is that for positive payoff differences the probability 183 of strategy imitation is high, and increases as the difference increases, the reverse being true for negative 184 payoff differences. In the case of the synchronous update rule (the dashed red line) the curve obeys equation
185
(3) for most payoff differences, as expected. The probabilities become noisier at very low payoff differences, (β = 0.5), the imitation probability curves in figures 9a and 9b are much steeper compared to those in figure   217 4. Therefore, if the number of cooperators in a group changes between payoff updates this has less of an 218 effect on the probability of strategy imitation, and so the choice of update rule will have less of an effect on 219 the final frequency of cooperation.
220
These results are confirmed by the empirical measurements of the change in imitation probability in figure followed by FCG (β = 0.5) and finally FCI (β = 0). Therefore, the choice of update rule will have the most impact for the FCI (β = 0.5), as here the probability of imitating a neighbouring defector changes 226 the most between payoff updates. What these results show is that when imitation probabilities are strongly 227 dependent on the composition of the groups in which the players outcomes will be significantly affected by 228 the choice of update rule. In this section we consider another common game used to model cooperation, namely the prisoner's 231 dilemma (PD). In the PD the game is played in pairs rather than groups, and the payoff for each player is 
where P i is the payoff of player i as usual, K max is the largest sum of the degrees of player i and j across 246 all of the layers, and b is the temptation to defect. We show that the choice of update rule also alters the in the group changes through the additional strategy update in the asynchronous case, this will not lead 259 to a large difference in imitation probability. This is not what is observed in figure 12b , where there is a 260 difference in the imitation probability between each value of N D . Therefore, if the number of cooperators 261 in a group changes, this will lead to a different imitation probability. 
Discussion and conclusion
263
We have shown that the asynchronous update rule consistently leads to higher frequencies of cooperation 264 over a range of enhancement factors in the public goods game, and can also increase cooperation in the 265 prisoner's dilemma. Through numerical simulations we find that the strength of the effect depends on a 266 number of factors, including the type of game played, the noise and the strategy imitation rule. In each of 267 these cases when the probability of a player of one strategy imitating another is highly sensitive to changes in when a player divides a single unit between its neighbours (the FCI PGG), compared to when a single unit 271 is donated to all (the FCG PGG). Therefore, the choice of rule is more significant for the FCI PGG. In 272 contrast, the prisoner's dilemma is not as sensitive to changes in the neighbourhood, and so the effect is 273 much less pronounced. A single change in a player's neighbourhood will alter the probability of strategy 274 imitation by large or small amounts depending on the strategy imitation rule chosen. If the payoff difference 275 imitation rule is used the probability is highly dependent on the neighbourhood, whereas the Fermi imitation 276 rule is much less sensitive. If the Fermi rule has a large noise parameter, this makes it more sensitive to a 277 change in the neighbourhood.
278
We conclude that if the strategy imitation rule is strongly payoff dependent, and if the average payoffs 279 of the game on the multiplex are greatly affected by the number of cooperators in a group, then updating 280 layers asynchronously will lead to an increase in cooperation for a wide parameter range. This suggests that 281 in order to model the evolution of cooperation robustly on multiplex networks, we must choose an updating 282 strategy that most accurately captures the dynamics of the real-world scenario we hope to model.
283
In general, updating layers asynchronously rather than synchronously increases the amount of coopera-284 tion on a multiplex network. This is because the probability of one strategy imitating another is sensitive 285 to the composition of a player's group. The more sensitive the probability of one player imitating another 286 is to the composition of the neighbourhood, the larger the difference in cooperation between the two rules.
287
The choice of asynchronous or synchronous updates also suggests a method of increasing cooperation on rate at which the payoffs are calculated. Specifically, this can be achieved with a move to asynchronous 290 updates rather than synchronous.
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